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How Should We Study District Judge
Decision-Making?
Pauline T. Kim
Margo Schlanger
Christina L. Boyd
Andrew D. Martin∗

INTRODUCTION
Understanding judicial decision-making requires attention to the
specific institutional settings in which judges operate. The choices
available to judges are determined not only by the law and facts of
the case but also by procedural context. The incentives and
constraints shaping judges’ decision-making will vary depending on,
for example, whether they have a life-appointment or are elected;
whether they hear cases alone or with colleagues; and whether and
under what circumstances their decisions might be altered,
overturned, or undone by the actions of others. The basic insight that
the institutional context matters has led to increasingly sophisticated
studies of how strategic interactions among Supreme Court justices,1
∗ All authors are affiliated with Washington University in St. Louis. Kim is Associate
Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law; Schlanger is Professor of
Law and Visiting Professor of Law at UCLA; Boyd is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science
and a Graduate Student Associate of the Center for Empirical Research in the Law (“CERL”);
Martin is Professor and CERL Director, School of Law, and Professor and Chair, Department
of Political Science, Arts & Sciences. We thank Washington University School of Law for
summer research support, Jessica Smith for assisting with the background research, and the
staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for organizing this symposium. The research described in
this paper is supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-0718831.
1. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL
J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000);
Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and GateKeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (empirically testing whether
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among branches of government,2 and within a judicial hierarchy3
shape judicial decision-making. But studies of federal district
judges—the nearly one thousand judges who compose 78% of the
federal judiciary4 and superintend 79% of its cases5—have not
matched this sophistication. Instead, much of the existing empirical
work on federal district courts has failed to take account of the
institutional setting in which those judges operate.
Too often, studies of the district courts rely on an implicit
assumption that judging at the trial court level is fundamentally the
Supreme Court Justices engage in strategic voting in certiorari decisions); Forrest Maltzman &
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996) (empirically testing whether Supreme Court Justices act
strategically in changing their votes between initial conference and final vote); Paul J.
Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998)
(examining Supreme Court draft opinions to test empirically whether they are written
strategically).
2. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)
(arguing that justices make decisions based not only on their political preferences but also
institutional constraints); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991) (theorizing that decision-making among
the three branches is a product of the dynamic interactions of the three branches). But see
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts,
91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997) (finding that justices deciding statutory cases largely vote
sincerely).
3. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEPHANIE LINQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING
(2006); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); Charles M.
Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101
(2000) (using principal-agent model of upper and lower courts to explore conflicts over policy);
Susan B. Haire, Stephanie A. Linquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the
Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 (2003);
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of
Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) (modeling judicial decision-making as product of
strategic interactions between upper and lower courts); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme
Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (examining the interactions
between courts of appeals and the Supreme Court and finding that the circuit courts are largely
responsive to the Supreme Court’s preferences).
4. These figures include both active and senior judges, on the district courts and the
courts of appeals. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 42, tbl.
11.
5. Id. at 19, tbl. 1; id. at 22, tbl. 3.
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same as judging at the appellate level. These studies therefore employ
models and methods developed to study the Supreme Court or the
federal courts of appeals. We argue below that this approach is
misguided, because the nature of district judges’ work is substantially
different from that of appellate judges. For example, unlike in the
typical appellate case, a district judge may rule in a single case on
multiple occasions and on different types of questions, only a few of
which could be dispositive but all of which affect the case’s progress
and ultimate outcome. Moreover, because many of the judge’s
actions are taken in response to motions by the parties, there is no
determinate sequence in which pretrial litigation events occur.
Rather, how a case proceeds depends on the choices made by the
parties—what motions are filed by whom and how discovery unfolds.
The work of the district judge is also more varied than that of an
appeals judge. In addition to the law-applying and law-interpreting
functions familiar to observers of the appellate courts, the district
judge undertakes other tasks such as finding facts, resolving disputes
about the scope of litigation, setting deadlines, facilitating settlement,
and supervising trial before a jury.6 Of course, as in the courts of
appeals, many cases in the district courts are resolved by agreement
or abandonment rather than adjudication.7 But in the district courts
far more than in the courts of appeals, even in these settled or
withdrawn cases, a judge has often made some or even many
decisions that may well have influenced the likelihood and the terms
of the non-adjudicated outcome.
In this Essay, we argue for a new and more suitable approach to
studying decision-making in the federal district courts—one that
takes into account the trial level litigation process and the varied
nature of the tasks judging in a trial court entails. We begin in Part I
by describing in detail the institutional setting in which district judges
function and how their role differs substantially from that of appellate
judges. In Part II we critique the existing empirical literature’s
predominant method for studying district courts—analysis of district
court opinions, usually published opinions—and discuss the
6. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Mori Irvine, Better Late than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of
Appeals, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 341 (1999); see also infra notes 50–51.
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limitations and biases inherent in this approach. Part III then proposes
our new approach to studying decision-making by district judges.
By taking advantage of the electronic docketing system now
operating in all federal district courts, researchers can use dockets,
orders, and other case documents, as well as opinions, as data
sources, thereby incorporating into their analysis the relevant
institutional features of district courts. In particular, expanding the
focus beyond opinions allows researchers to capture both the
procedural context and the iterative nature of district judge decisionmaking. In addition, examining dockets permits direct study of the
incidence and timing of party settlements and their resulting effects
on case selection. Conversely, docket information can be used to test
whether judicial decisions in turn influence litigants’ settlement
behavior. Finally, in Part IV, we describe an ongoing project focused
on the litigation activities of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, in which we implement this new approach to studying
the work of the district courts.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Much of the quantitative work on judicial decision-making
focuses on appellate judging and therefore relies on models that
assume features typical of appellate courts. For example, the
considerable literature on the United States Supreme Court builds on
observations about that Court’s unique position as a collegial court
situated at the top of the judicial hierarchy, with a discretionary
docket.8 Similarly, scholars who study the federal courts of appeals
take into account their location in the judicial hierarchy, modeling
their compliance with Supreme Court precedent,9 the interaction
among judges on appellate panels,10 and the determinants of en banc
8. See, e.g., H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial
Hierarchy, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61 (2003); Cameron et al., supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; McNollgast, supra note 3; Songer et al.,
supra note 3.
10. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Sean
Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority
Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Cass R.
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review and en banc decisions.11 But in the relatively scant empirical
literature on district courts, little attention has been paid to how their
institutional features shape judges’ decision-making. Empirical
studies of district courts have tended unreflectively to borrow models
developed to study the appellate courts, without considering the
systematic ways in which trial and appellate courts differ. As we
argue below, the work of district judges differs in significant ways
from that of appellate judges, and these differences must be taken
into account in order to build appropriate models for studying district
judge decision-making.
A. Federal Courts of Appeals
Empirical scholars often begin with the assumption that federal
court of appeals judges have policy preferences that they seek to
advance through their decisions.12 Although federal judges are
technically non-partisan, they are appointed through a political
process involving presidential nomination and Senate confirmation—
a process during which ideological concerns are often raised. On the
other hand, as Article III judges, they have life tenure and their salary
cannot be diminished, affording them a degree of insulation from
direct political pressure once appointed. Given this institutional
structure, a number of studies have sought to determine whether and
to what extent court of appeals decisions are influenced by judges’
policy goals or constrained by legal precedent.13
Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa M. Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:
A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and
Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, U.
PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009).
11. See, e.g., Tracey George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Tracey George & Michael E. Solimine,
Supreme Court Monitoring of Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001).
12. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 3; Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; Cameron
et al., supra note 3; Cross & Tiller, supra note 10; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 3; Songer et
al., supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006); Benesh & Reddick, supra note 3; Cross &
Tiller, supra note 10; Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence
from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); Songer et al., supra note 3; Paul J.
Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997).
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As intermediate level courts, the courts of appeals review
decisions of the federal trial courts. Their cases follow a well-defined
trajectory through the appellate process to resolution. The process is
initiated when a litigant, unhappy with a decision below, files a
timely notice of appeal.14 That notice triggers a fairly predictable set
of events: the record is prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court;15 briefs are filed in turn by the parties (appellant’s opening
brief, appellee’s brief, appellant’s reply brief);16 the case is
calendared for oral argument unless the court decides argument is
unnecessary;17 a three-judge panel convenes to decide the case;18 and,
ultimately, those judges issue some kind of written decision, which
may or may not be designated for publication.
Settlement,19 abandonment, or a procedural defect in the appeal
may halt the process in its tracks,20 but otherwise cases proceed in a
fairly predictable way. Minor variations in this procedural account
may occur—for example, there may be motions to extend time
deadlines, permit the participation of amici, or stay a case pending
some other event. However, in the vast majority of federal appellate
cases that are adjudicated, the basic process leading to final
resolution does not deviate significantly from the one just described.
Not only is the appellate process largely standardized, but the nature
of the appellate judge’s role is similarly well defined. The basic task
facing the appellate judge is quite straightforward, if not always
simple to carry out. She must consider the record from the court
14. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).
15. E.g., ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 133–34 (2d ed.
1989).
16. STEVEN WISOTSKY, PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL: BRINGING AND OPPOSING
APPEALS 130–31 (2002).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Appellate court mediation programs have become increasingly popular in recent years.
In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, cases can be directed to formal mediation by “[a]n active
or senior judge of the court of appeals, a panel of judges (either before or after oral argument),
or the Kinnard Mediation Center, by appointment of the court.” 11TH CIR. R. 33(c). According
to the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he purposes of the mediation are to explore the possibility of
settlement of the dispute, to prevent unnecessary motions or delay by attempting to resolve any
procedural problems in the appeal, and to identify and clarify issues presented in the appeal.”
Id.; see also Irvine, supra note 7.
20. WISOTSKY, supra note 16, at 241–60.
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below, the relevant legal authorities and the arguments of the parties
and, together with her panel colleagues, pass judgment on the
decision of the district court that is being appealed—either affirming
it, reversing it, or remanding the case to the district court for further
consideration. Thus, her primary role is one of law application and
law interpretation.
B. Federal District Courts
Federal district judges, like federal court of appeals judges, are
appointed through a process of presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation to positions of life tenure. And, as in the case of
appellate judges, scholars have posited that district judges are
political actors—that is, that they have policy goals and preferences
that influence how they decide cases.21 District judges, however,
work in a very different environment than court of appeals judges do.
Even assuming that they have policy goals, their position as trial
judges—the first responders in a judicial system open to a growing
number of claimants—suggests that concerns about case management
and docket control are also significant, if not dominant, motivations.
Moreover, district judges interact with their colleagues in quite
different ways. While the court of appeals judge hears cases as a
member of a three-judge panel that is usually composed of her circuit
colleagues, a single district judge is usually assigned to a case at any
given time. However, the district judge does not necessarily
determine the outcomes of cases alone. Magistrate judges, appointed
by the judges in a district for eight-year terms, play an increasingly
important role in managing federal litigation. Both a magistrate and a
district court judge may make decisions on different issues in the
same case. And because district court litigation can stretch over long
periods of time, recusals, retirements, and the like may mean that
more than one district judge or more than one magistrate judge will
make decisions in a given case over its lifetime. Unlike in the courts
of appeals, it is nearly impossible to identify a standard way in which
cases proceed through the district courts. Although district court
21. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1996).
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cases, like appellate cases, are frequently settled or abandoned before
judgment,22 far more variation exists than at the appellate level in the
procedure followed and in the role of the judge prior to the nonadjudicated resolution. At one extreme, the parties to a dispute may
invoke the power of the court only to facilitate judicial enforcement
of an agreement they have reached out of court. In such a case, the
judge may do nothing to resolve the dispute other than entering a
jointly proposed consent decree, the terms of which are determined—
possibly even prior to filing—by the parties. At the other extreme, a
case may remain active in the district court for years, even decades,
involving multiple parties, multiple judges, teams of lawyers,
complex procedural maneuvering and extensive discovery, a trial
before a jury, and post-trial skirmishing before a final judgment is
entered. In such a case, the district judge will be required to make
case-specific decisions at multiple points throughout the litigation,
deciding numerous pre-trial motions, resolving discovery disputes,
setting schedules and discovery limits, presiding over the trial
proceedings, and ruling on post-trial motions.23 Between these two
extremes, in the more typical case, a district judge, perhaps assisted
by a magistrate judge, will preside over a status and/or settlement
conference or two, issue a handful of orders regarding scheduling and
other administrative matters, and perhaps decide a few pre-trial
motions before the case is resolved by a settlement between the
parties.
This description of the work of the district courts highlights a
number of important differences from the appellate courts. First,
district judges often make multiple decisions at different times before
a case is finally resolved, while appellate court judges typically act in
a case at a single point in time—when rendering a decision on the
appeal. Thus, when making a decision, the district judge is aware that
she may have other opportunities to shape the outcome of the case.
For example, the district judge knows that if she grants a motion to
dismiss with prejudice, the case will be removed from her docket;
22. See infra notes 52–53.
23. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681 (2007) (reporting considerable variance in
number of docket entries in district court cases studied).
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however, if she denies the motion, she will make other decisions later
in the case, unless it is settled or abandoned first. Another difference
from appellate cases is that litigation events in district courts do not
inevitably occur in a fixed sequence. It is true that certain events
typically precede other events; however, all possible events do not
inevitably occur, and if they occur, they will not necessarily happen
in any particular order. For example, a defendant may bring a motion
to dismiss before answering the complaint; choose to answer without
bringing such a motion at all; or move to dismiss the case for failure
to state a claim at a much later time, even at trial. As a result of these
litigant choices, district court cases, in contrast to appellate cases,
may involve any of a nearly infinite number of combinations of pretrial, trial, and post-trial decisions by the judge.
In addition to differences in the number and timing of judicial
decisions, the types of decisions judges make are quite different in
district courts and courts of appeals. Some of the district judge’s
decisions—for example, whether or not to dismiss a case for failure
to state a claim, whether or not to grant summary judgment, or
whether a plaintiff has proven liability at trial—look a great deal like
prototypical appellate decisions. They are clearly “on the merits” in
the sense that the judge is adjudicating the relative strengths of the
legal or factual claims made by the parties. They involve assessing
the evidence offered by the parties and/or applying the law to the
facts presented by the case. In some instances, where a case raises a
novel issue, a judge may interpret ambiguous legal authority.
Depending on who wins, many of these “on the merits” decisions are
final judgments and therefore directly appealable.24
However, unique to the work of district judges is their role in
establishing a factual record. The district judge must decide what
evidence is relevant and admissible for what purposes, and how
certain facts will be entered in the record. If a jury sits as the ultimate
fact-finder, the judge must instruct them about the evidence and
frame the factual issues for them to decide. In the case of a bench
24. “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). A final decision is “one
which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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trial, the district judge must sift through the evidence herself,
weighing its probativeness, drawing inferences, and ultimately
determining matters of historical fact. While subject to appeal, these
factual determinations by a district court are reviewed under an
extremely deferential standard of review.25
Unlike appellate judges, moreover, district judges make many
other types of decisions that neither resolve the parties’ dispute nor
directly address the merits of the parties’ existing claims. Although
characterized as “procedural,” these decisions can have an enormous
impact on the scope of the subsequent litigation and thus the
likelihood that a given litigant will ultimately prevail. For example, a
district judge may decide whether to grant a motion to allow the
plaintiff to amend her complaint to add new theories of liability,
whether to permit the defendant to bring counterclaims against the
plaintiff, whether to compel a party to produce certain materials in
discovery, or whether to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of
a trial. In each of these situations, the decision of the district judge
does not resolve or even directly address the merits of the claims or
defenses. Nevertheless, the influence on the subsequent course and
outcome of the litigation can be profound. The plaintiff unable to add
a new theory of liability or discover information critical to her case
will face lower odds of ultimately prevailing in the case. Similarly,
the defendant’s prospects diminish if it cannot pursue a counterclaim
or if it must respond to evidence of catastrophic harm suffered by a
plaintiff at the same time that it tries to deny liability. By changing
the odds facing each party, these “procedural” decisions also affect
the relative strengths of the parties’ negotiating positions and
therefore the terms on which they will be willing to settle. Although
these types of decisions constitute a substantial proportion of the
district judge’s work, they are usually not final decisions and
therefore are only rarely reviewed by courts of appeals.26
25. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
26. Although in theory interlocutory appeal is possible pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(2006), a district court must first state in writing that an otherwise unappealable order “involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation,” and the court of appeals must agree to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(2006). In fact, few interlocutory orders are ever reviewed pursuant to § 1292(b). See Michael
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Finally, in addition to making decisions “on the merits” and on
procedural matters affecting the scope of litigation, district judges
increasingly act in a “managerial” role, diverging even further from
court of appeals judges. A quarter century ago, Judith Resnick
described the emergence of “managerial judging,” in which district
judges do not simply adjudicate disputes brought to them by the
parties, but instead assume an active role in supervising cases and
take on the responsibility of shepherding them to a final resolution.27
This shift in the nature of the district judge’s role has only become
more pronounced in the time since Resnick wrote. Today, district
judges are required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to enter
a scheduling order in every case soon after its initiation.28 The
scheduling order must set time limits for joining parties, amending
the pleadings, filing motions, and completing discovery, and may
also include directions regarding required disclosures and electronic
discovery, address issues of privilege or work product protection, and
set dates for conferences and trial. In addition, the district judge is
empowered under Rule 16 to address such matters as “formulating
and simplifying the issues,” the possibility of settlement, the use of
procedural devices for promoting dispute resolution, and “adopting
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted
actions.”29
The shift to managerial judging substantially affects the nature of
the district judge’s role. Under the traditional model of
adjudication—largely still applicable in the appellate courts—judges
are detached from the process by which evidence and arguments are
brought before the court.30 The litigants, outside the view of the
court, develop their strategies and theories and then present the
factual record, relevant authorities, and legal arguments through
E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1165, 1174 (1990) (reporting that in the 1980s about 35% of § 1292(b) appeals were accepted,
representing only about 0.3% of appeals).
27. Resnick, supra note 6.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2) says that “[t]he judge must issue the scheduling order as soon
as practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days after any defendant has been
served with the complaint of 90 days after any defendant has appeared.”
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c).
30. Resnick, supra note 6.
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written submissions or highly structured public testimony by
witnesses or legal argument by lawyers. Communications between
the attorneys and the court are formal, public, and limited in scope. In
contrast, federal district judges today interact with the parties—or at
least their attorneys—in a variety of ways both formal and informal
and on a broad scope of issues. In order to create a scheduling order,
judges must discuss with the attorneys their views about the
complexity of a case, the central issues it raises and the evidentiary or
management challenges it presents. Resolving discovery disputes
requires judges to “immerse themselves in the factual details of the
case” at an early stage of the litigation and to “consider the parties’
litigation strategies.”31 Moreover, heavy caseloads incentivize judges
to actively encourage settlement by discussing likely trial outcomes
with the litigants or referring cases for alternative dispute resolution
procedures.
In short, judging on the federal district courts is fundamentally
different from appellate judging.
II. EXISTING STUDIES OF DISTRICT JUDGE DECISION-MAKING
Despite the significant differences between judging on the district
and appellate courts, most quantitative studies of judicial decisionmaking have treated them largely the same. (There are, however, a
few notable exceptions,32 along with qualitative studies that have
more frequently taken full account of trial court contexts.)33
Following methods developed to study Supreme Court and court of
appeals decision-making, a number of scholars have collected data on
the outcomes of district court cases using officially published reports
or, more recently, electronically available opinions as the source of
data. Coding these outcomes as liberal or conservative, or according
31. Id. at 393.
32. Malcolm Feeley’s classic exploration of trial-level criminal court proceedings is a
source of insight here, though he finds quantitative analysis fairly unhelpful, and moves quickly
on to the qualitative analysis that is the core of his book. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 123–53 (1979).
33. See id. at 154–297; KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS:
STATE COURT POLICY IMPACT AND FUNCTIONS IN A LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1967);
BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT
IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993).
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to the success or failure of certain arguments or parties, scholars have
sought to answer such questions as whether judges are political
policy-makers, whether their decisions are influenced by social
background characteristics or prior experiences, or whether they tend
to favor certain types of litigants or legal theories.34
Work by C. K. Rowland and Robert A. Carp is typical of the
approach taken by many political scientists studying the federal
district courts. In perhaps the most comprehensive study of district
court decision-making, Rowland and Carp analyzed nearly 46,000
opinions published in the Federal Supplement over a 44-year
period.35 They divided the cases according to issue area and coded
the outcome of each as “liberal” or “conservative.”36 Analyzing this
34. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Robert A. Carp et
al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993);
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004); Robert A. Hillman,
Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical
Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of
Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 4; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and
District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623 (2003); C. K. Rowland, Robert A. Carp & Ronald
A. Stidham, Judges’ Policy Choices and the Value Basis of Judicial Appointments: A
Comparison of Support for Criminal Defendants Among Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy
Appointees to the Federal District Courts, 46 J. POL. 886 (1984); C. K. Rowland, Donald
Songer & Robert A. Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal
Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 191 (1988); Vicki Schultz & Stephen
Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense
in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992); Jennifer A.
Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137 (2000); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching
for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting
Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996); Thomas G.
Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process
Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985); Thomas G. Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan
Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (1972); Adam Winkler,
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
35. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 18.
36. Id. at 22–23.
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outcome data, they concluded that Democratic judges are more likely
to vote liberally than Republican judges, although the degree of
partisan difference varies depending upon the issue.37 They further
examined this outcome data for correlations with the composition of
the Supreme Court, time trends, the party of the appointing President,
and geographic influences.38 Other studies by judicial politics
scholars have followed a similar strategy of coding the outcomes of
district court opinions as liberal or conservative in order to test
theories about judicial decision-making.39
Empirically minded legal scholars have asked different questions,
but have also largely relied on opinions—usually published ones—
for analysis. Some have examined federal district court opinions in
order to determine whether social background or prior professional
experience influences judicial decision-making. For example,
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss studied
published federal district court and appellate opinions in religious
freedom cases and concluded that the religious background of judges,
as well as the religious affiliation of claimants, significantly
influenced judicial votes in these cases.40 Other scholars have
explored how various legal doctrines affect who wins certain types of
cases, again relying on published district court opinions for their
data.41 For example, Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson examined
published Title VII opinions to determine how plaintiffs fared when
resisting a “lack of interest” defense in races and sex discrimination
cases.42
Focusing only on published opinions may make sense when
asking, for example, how formal legal doctrine has evolved.
However, when research aims to understand what factors influence
case outcomes or how judges make decisions, an analysis based
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id. at 25–38, 39–44, 45–57, 58–86.
39. See, e.g., Carp et al., supra note 34; Rowland, Carp & Stidham, supra note 34;
Rowland, Songer & Carp, supra note 34; Stidham et al., supra note 34; Walker & Barrow,
supra note 34; Walker, supra note 34.
40. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 34, at 613–14.
41. E.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 34; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 34;
Winkler, supra note 34.
42. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 34, at 1089.
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solely on published opinions is problematic. In particular, such an
approach risks producing biased or misleading results because
published opinions are not representative of all opinions; opinions are
not representative of all district court decisions; and adjudicated cases
are not representative of all filed cases. To begin, published
opinions—at both the district court and appellate levels—constitute
only a small portion of opinions,43 and that portion is decidedly
unrepresentative. Opinions are not randomly selected for publication;
rather, authoring judges decide whether to designate a particular
opinion for publication, and their decision to do so may depend upon
formal rules, court culture, personal predilections, or strategic
considerations. Numerous studies have found that published and
unpublished opinions differ in systematic ways.44 For example,
Rowland and Carp found that published district court opinions are
generally more “liberal” than unpublished ones, and that ideological
influences appear to be greater in the former compared with the
latter.45 Some scholars have justified their focus on published
43. Of the 41% of cases that are briefed and submitted, only one-quarter have published
opinions. Data derived from Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data
Base, 2006, Study No. 4685 (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/
STUDY/09422.xml.
44. See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 123–28; David S. Law, Strategic
Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 817 (2005); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases:
A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782 (1992); Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial
Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil
Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990); Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United
States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL.
206 (1988).
45. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 123–28. As Evan J. Ringquist and Craig E.
Emmert summarized in 1999:
The most thorough comparison of political influences on published and unpublished
district court decisions, that of Rowland and Carp (1996), reaches three general
conclusions regarding this comparison. First, in almost all instances, court decisions in
published cases were more “liberal” than court decisions in unpublished cases. . . .
Second, more often than not, appointment effects were greater in published case
decisions than in unpublished case decisions. . . . Finally, while Ducat and Dudley
(1989) found that the published decisions of federal judges were much more likely to
support the policy and legal positions of the presidents who appointed them, Rowland
and Carp (1996) find no such cohort effect for unpublished decisions.
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opinions by arguing that published opinions likely include the
important, policy-making cases.46 However, it is not true that only
unimportant or easy cases in the district courts are decided without
published opinions.47 Donald Songer found that more than half of the
court of appeals cases sampled that involved reversals or
nonunanimous decisions (presumed to be more difficult cases) were
reviewing unpublished district court decisions, and half of the portion
of the Supreme Court’s caseload in the 1980 term that originated in
federal trial courts had unpublished district court opinions.48 Thus,
published district court opinions can neither be taken as
representative of all district court opinions nor assumed to capture all
of the important policy-making decisions.
Although publication bias plagues both district court and court of
appeals studies, another form of bias—introduced by the focus on
opinions, whether or not published—particularly affects the study of
district courts. As discussed above, a district judge may make many
decisions of varying types at different points in time in a single case.
Most are not accompanied by written reasons and therefore are
recorded on the docket sheet or in a brief order as simply a decision
to “grant” or “deny” a particular motion. For example, a judge will
frequently decide motions to compel discovery without offering
written reasons. Even decisions “on the merits”—a denial of a motion
to dismiss, for example—may be issued without written explanation.
Whether on the merits or not, these decisions can have a significant
impact on the potential outcome and may reflect a judge’s attitude
Ringquist & Emmert, supra note 44, at 15 (discussing ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, and
Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During
the Postwar Era, 51 J. POL. 98 (1989)).
46. ROBERT CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 18 (1983); ROWLAND & CARP supra note 21, at 20–21; Philip Shuchman &
Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of “No
Precendent Value”?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980).
47. Pamela Foa, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit’s Non-Publication
Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The NonPrecedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeal, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); cf. Donald Songer, Donna Smith &
Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 963 (1989); Allan Vestal, Reported Federal District Court Opinions: Fiscal
1962, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 185 (1966).
48. Songer, supra note 44, at 211, 213.
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toward the case or the litigants. However, without an accompanying
written statement of reasons, the decision is not an “opinion” but an
“order,” and, as such, it will not appear in Westlaw or Lexis, even as
“unpublished.” Although such orders are also components of court
decision-making worthy of study, they are largely inaccessible from
traditional data sources. Using a sample from 2003—well after
Westlaw and Lexis began systematically including unpublished
opinions—David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R.
Lidicker found that only 3% of judicial actions were accompanied by
opinions.49 Even excluding purely ministerial orders, they were able
to access written opinions for less than 20% of judicial orders in the
cases they examined.50 Thus, unlike in the courts of appeals, many
district court decisions are not captured at all in opinions, published
or not, making opinions even more unrepresentative of district judge
decision-making. Indeed, it seems plausible that judges are more
likely to write opinions to accompany appealable orders—grants but
not denials of motions to dismiss or of summary judgment, for
example.51
Litigant choices produce yet another type of selection effect that
can bias studies of judicial decision-making that focus only on court
opinions or even court decisions. As in the appellate courts,52 decided
cases constitute only a fraction of disputes that are filed in the district
courts. In 2006, for example, less than half of the cases disposed of
by the district courts were resolved by some sort of adjudication.
About the same proportion were either abandoned or settled.53
49. Hoffman et al., supra note 23, at 682.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 719–20 n.161, 720–21.
52. Not every appealable order is in fact appealed, and even among appealed cases, many
are settled or abandoned by the parties prior to the issuance of an appellate decision. In 2006,
for example, only about 40% of cases with noticed appeals in the federal courts of appeals
proceeded to briefed submission and judicial decision. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 43.
The set of such cases is defined by its exclusions: an additional 30% of the noticed cases were
settled and withdrawn under FED. R. APP. P. 42 or defaulted by one party or the other, 26%
were disposed of for non-merits reasons (jurisdictional defects, or denials of a certificate of
appealability), and for the remainder the relevant fields do not specify the reason for the nonmerits disposition.
53. In 2006 (the last year for which data are available), of the cases disposed of by district
courts (rather than transferred and the like), 47% were abandoned or settled, another 47% were
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Because there is no reason to expect that cases settle randomly,
litigated cases will be unrepresentative of filed cases.54 Moreover,
given that district court cases unfold dynamically over time, the
decisions observed at any particular stage of the litigation will be
drawn from a different pool than those observed at another stage. For
example, cases that are tried likely differ in important ways from
those in which a summary judgment decision is reached; those cases
in turn likely differ from those in which some discovery occurs.
Thus, the litigants’ choices regarding whether and when to settle or
abandon a case have the effect of selecting which cases survive long
enough to evoke different types of court decisions.
Because of these various selection effects, studying only district
court opinions—particularly only published opinions—creates
significant risks of misleading results. Consider, for example,
Rowland and Carp’s classic study of district judge decision-making,
which asks whether district judges’ decisions are influenced by their
ideology. As they acknowledge, by looking only at published
opinions, they may well over- or under-estimate the role of
ideology.55 It may be the case, as their own preliminary look at
unpublished opinions suggests, that decisions not memorialized in a
written opinion are less subject to political influences and that
therefore the effects of ideology will be less significant across the
whole range of district judge decisions than appears from an analysis
of published opinions.56 Alternatively, district judges may be more
inclined to allow their policy preferences to hold sway when their
decisions are subject to the least scrutiny—because they are
adjudicated in some way (a mere 1% by trial), and 6% do not have available data on the
disposition type. Id.
54. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 44. Of course, it is also true that filed cases are
unrepresentative of all disputes, because potential litigants must first recognize their injuries as
grievances and decide to pursue litigation, and their decisions to do so will not be random. See
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). More
specifically, as Ahmed Taha has suggested, litigant choices to file a case or not may be
influenced by the composition or perceived preferences of the trial bench. Ahmed E. Taha,
Judges’ Political Orientations and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation (Wake Forest
University Legal Studies Paper No. 963468, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
963468.
55. ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 21, at 121–23.
56. Id.
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expressed in the form of a summary order and are unlikely to be
reviewed by an appellate court.57 Another possibility, not explicitly
explored by Rowland and Carp is that the role of ideology may vary
depending upon the stage of litigation at which a judge decides.
Similarly, Sisk et al.’s conclusion, based on a study of published
opinions, that the religious background of judges influences their
decisions in religious freedom cases58 may also hold true of their
decisions in summary orders or on procedural matters. But without
examining all district judge decisions and controlling for the
procedural context in which they are made, there is simply no way to
know.
III. STUDYING DISTRICT COURT DECISION-MAKING
Given the significant problems introduced by relying on
opinions—particularly only published opinions—we argue for a
different approach for studying district judge decision-making, one
that takes into account the institutional role of district courts and the
nature of judging at the trial court level. In brief, we believe that the
study of district judge decision-making should focus on decisions, not
opinions. That is, it should encompass all decisions—whether or not
published and whether or not accompanied by written reasons—and,
in doing so, should take into account the specific procedural context
in which those decisions are made.
One of the principal justifications in the past for relying on
published opinions was purely practical. In 1969, for example,
Dolbeare defended his use of opinions by pointing out the absence of
a practicable alternative:
For what it may be worth in exculpatory terms, we may note
that there appears to be no more rigorous way to gather data on
the outcomes of cases [other than relying on opinions in F.
Supp.], short of a review of transcripts in each court’s file—a
57. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 257, 264
(1995) (arguing that judicial decision-making is more likely to be constrained when a judge
must articulate reasons for a decision).
58. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 34.
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task whose dimensions foreclose the prospect of more than
case study or sampling, rather than comparative terms.59
Technological advances have obviated this justification. Over
time, Lexis and Westlaw have included an increasing number of
unpublished opinions in their databases, making these opinions as
easy to access as officially “published” opinions. More importantly,
however, with the advent of electronic docketing systems, researchers
can access information on all court activity, not just opinions, in a
given case. Each of the ninety-four U.S. district courts now uses a
system, entitled “Public Access to Court Electronic Records”
(“PACER”), that makes this information available on the internet.60
Complete electronic docket sheets are available in most districts for
cases filed from the mid-1990s on. In each subsequent year, coverage
has increased, and it is essentially universal for current cases. PACER
docket sheets offer a wealth of readily accessible information
permitting study of how cases proceed through the district courts and
what role judges play. They identify the district judge and any
magistrate judges connected to the case, as well as the parties and
their lawyers. They also contain brief descriptions and the dates of
every litigation event before the court—such as the filing of
pleadings and motions, court orders, hearings, conferences, and
verdicts.61 Thus, with internet access, dockets can now be retrieved
for federal cases nationwide at a small fraction of the cost and effort
once required to obtain that information.
In addition to the docket sheets, PACER makes other case
documents available electronically. Under the Case Management/
Electronic Case Files system (“CM/ECF”), the parties file case
59. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Federal District Courts and Urban Public Policy: An
Exploratory Study, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 378 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph
Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
60. Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule (Issued in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913,
1914, 1926, 1930, 1932) (Mar. 11, 2008), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/epa_
feesched.pdf.
61. These entries are done free-form by clerk’s office staff, within hours of the events’
occurrence. Because maintenance of dockets is a core function of court clerk’s office personnel,
PACER dockets are extraordinarily accurate. For a proposal that dockets include mark-up
coding, to allow their easier batch analysis, see Lynn Lopucki, Court System Transparency,
(Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-10-01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013380.
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documents such as pleadings and motions papers electronically in
portable document format (“pdf”). The court then links these
electronic documents to the relevant docket entries recording their
filing. Since about 2005, pdf versions of case documents have been
available through PACER for nearly every case in nearly every
district, and in some districts they are available for documents dating
back as many as ten years. These documents can be downloaded for a
fee of 8¢ per page (with a maximum of $2.40 per document).62
Written opinions filed after mid-2005 are available for free.63 Thus,
PACER offers a significant data source for more accurately capturing
and understanding the activity of the district courts.64
We propose that, rather than relying on opinions, scholars use
dockets and the other case documents available on PACER as data
sources for studying district judge decision-making. By looking at
dockets, researchers can capture all of the critical decisions in a case,
thereby avoiding the problems of selection bias introduced by relying
only on opinions or published opinions.
Only a handful of prior studies, some pre-dating the advent of
PACER,65 have made use of dockets to understand district court
litigation, and none has fully exploited the advantages of doing so for
studying district judge decision-making.66 For example, the Civil
62. Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, supra note 60.
63. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, § 204–05, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913–14
(codified in notes of 44 U.S.C. § 3501) (2006).
64. See Peter Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data,
Particulars to Patterns (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-003, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107412 (detailing
PACER’s advancements and drawbacks).
65. In addition to the studies discussed below in notes 66–70, examples of other studies
using non-internet methods to obtain dockets include Christian Wollschläger, Civil Litigation
and Modernization: The Work of the Municipal Courts of Bremen, Germany, in Five Centuries,
1549–1984, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262–64 (1990); F. Van Loon & E. Langerwerf,
Socioeconomic Development and the Evolution of Litigation Rates of Civil Courts in Belgium,
1835–1980, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 283 (1990); Ross E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When
Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 789 (2000). For a critique of these sorts of studies, see Richard Lempert, Docket Data
and “Local Knowledge”: Studying the Court and Society Link Over Time, 24 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 321 (1990).
66. A number of scholars have used docket research as a way of understanding the
makeup of particular court caseloads (for example, to assess time trends relating to which
disputes get litigated or litigation rates, or to describe litigation activity and its participants or
intensity). Other studies have used dockets to assess case outcomes (for example, Burbank’s
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Litigation Research Project (“CLRP”) collected docket, case file, and
interview data on over 1600 civil lawsuits terminated in 1978 in 5
federal and 5 state trial courts. That project, however, focused on the
cost, pace, frequency, and stakes of mid-range civil disputes67 and on
the settlement dynamics between parties68 rather than on judicial
decision-making. To the extent that the CLRP examined the role of
the judge in promoting settlement, it did so not by examining docket
activity in individual cases, but by aggregating survey data on
judicial case management practices within each district studied.69
Eisenberg and Schwab also collected data from dockets in order to
assess the nature and extent of civil rights and prisoner litigation in
three federal district courts during 1980-81.70 Together with
Ashenfelter, they used this data source to test whether judicial
background influences settlement and win rates in these types of
cases.71 Specifically, they used measures such as the mean settlement
rate or the mean plaintiff win rate for each district judge in their study
to capture case outcomes. Comparing these outcomes measures
across judges, they found little evidence that individual judge
characteristics explain variation in outcomes.72 By using dockets to
study of the use of summary judgment). Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL
STUD. 591 (2004). For other examples of use of digitized dockets as a datasource on case
outcomes more than case dynamics, see, for example, Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (using dockets along with other data); Josh Lerner, Tilting the
Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (using dockets to
analyze preliminary relief in patent cases). Although these types of studies inform us about
litigation trends and the nature of disputing, they have not taken advantage of dockets to study
judicial decision-making.
67. For information on the Civil Litigation Research Project, see, for example, David M.
Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer, & Joel B. Grossman, The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983).
68. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991).
69. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Judge’s Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assessing
the Need for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28 (1982).
70. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore
Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988).
71. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57.
72. Id. at 281.
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collect data on all filed civil rights cases, they avoided many of the
selection problems plaguing other studies of judicial decisionmaking. However, their method for testing for judge effects—
comparing mean outcomes across individual judges—requires
aggregating results, thus treating all settlements alike and all court
judgments for plaintiffs alike. It matters, though, not only whether,
but when, settlement occurs. Similarly, a court outcome for the
plaintiff that results from a summary judgment ruling differs from
one that is the result of a jury verdict. Each result suggests something
different about judicial decision-making.
More recently, Hoffman et al. have argued, as we do here, for the
intensive study of trial court dockets available through PACER and
against reliance on opinions.73 In particular, they were focused on the
particular question of when district judges choose to write opinions—
that is, to provide written reasons to accompany their decisions—
rather than relying on summary orders. Examining decisions, rather
than opinions, they found that each case typically involves multiple
judicial decisions and that the distribution of court activity across
cases is highly skewed, with many cases having only a handful of
docket entries, while a few cases had hundreds.74 After categorizing
court decisions by procedural type—management orders,
intermediate orders and final action orders—they found that the
likelihood that a given order would result in a written opinion varied
substantially with the type of order and concluded that the decision to
write an opinion is significantly affected by the procedural context.75
73. Hoffman et al., supra note 23. They propose a methodological approach they call
“docketology”—that is, “the intensive study of trial court dockets” and contrast it with the
standard approach of “opinionology”—gathering a sample of court opinions and subjecting
them to analysis. Id. at 684–85, 694.
74. Id. at 709.
75. “Management orders” in Hoffman et al.’s classification scheme are orders, such as
discovery orders, that “are rarely immediately appealable.” Id. at 715. They also refer to
“intermediate orders,” such as motions to dismiss, that are only sometimes appealed and “final
actions orders”, like summary judgment, that are “almost always conclusive and appealable.”
Id. at 715. To the extent that this classification is intended to capture the likelihood of an
appeal, the categories are imprecise because the actual outcome of the motion—i.e., whether a
summary judgment motion is granted or denied—will affect the likelihood that it will be
appealed. The authors recognize this issue and take it into account in their later analysis. See id.
at 719–20. Regardless of the inexactness of their classification scheme, Hoffman and his
colleagues make an important contribution by demonstrating that the likelihood that a district
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Their work demonstrates the risks of studying only opinions, as well
as the possibilities of using dockets as a source of data. However,
their research focused narrowly on the question of when judges write
opinions rather than using the wealth of data available in dockets to
examine why judges make the substantive decisions that they do.
Although each of these prior studies relying on dockets for
information has contributed insights not available from a limited
focus on opinions, they failed to fully exploit the possibilities for
using docket information to study district judge decision-making. In
particular, studying dockets offers several distinct advantages. First,
dockets allow researchers to take into account the stage of litigation
in which a particular judicial decision occurs and to control for the
effects of procedural context. Second, by examining what types of
cases settle at what stages of the litigation, researchers can directly
study the selection process that shapes the pool of cases that are
resolved by adjudication. And finally, the reverse question can be
explored as well: Does judicial decision-making affect the parties’
settlement decisions?
The first advantage is that studying dockets permits a comparison
of decisions which are truly comparable—i.e., those made in the
same procedural context—rather than simply comparing whatever
decisions are available. In traditional outcome studies of court
opinions, researchers tend to lump together all “liberal” decisions—
for example, votes in favor of a civil rights plaintiff—without paying
attention to the type of decision being made. However, a decision to
deny a motion to dismiss that favors a civil rights plaintiff has a very
different consequence than a decision entering a verdict in favor of
that same plaintiff. Moreover, the same judge who denied a
defendant’s motion to dismiss early in a case may subsequently grant
its motion for summary judgment. Thus, ignoring the type of decision
being made creates not so much a problem of comparing apples to
oranges, but one of comparing tadpoles to frogs: differences among
observations may be attributable to the stage of the litigation at which
the decision is made.
judge’s decision will be accompanied by a written opinion varies significantly depending upon
the type of decision.
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This problem is best illustrated with some examples. Suppose a
study undertakes to examine whether political affiliation or social
background factors influence the likelihood that a judge will vote in
favor of plaintiffs in certain types of cases. Consider four
hypothetical cases with the following event histories:
Case A
Event 1
Complaint filed
Event 2
Settled
Event 3
Event 4
Event 5
Event 6
OUTCOME Settled

Case B
Complaint filed
Answer filed
D. moves for SJ
SJ denied
Settled
Settled

Case C
Complaint filed
Answer filed
D. moves for SJ
SJ denied
Trial
D. verdict
Judgment for D.

Case D
Complaint filed
Answer filed
D. moves for SJ
SJ granted

Judgment for D.

A study that focused only on case outcomes might view cases A
and B as similar and C and D as similar. However, the outcomes in
each pair of cases are not identical. From the perspective of judicial
decision-making, cases B and C are more similar than A and B, or C
and D. After all, in cases B and C, the judge denied defendants’
motion for summary judgment. If the goal is to understand judicial
decision-making, it is important to recognize that the judge’s
summary judgment decision in C (at event 4) was the opposite of the
analogous decision in D (also at event 4). To state the point more
generally, because district court litigation occurs in sequence, the
stage or procedural posture of a decision is crucial. Looking only at
the end result or comparing judgments made at different points in the
litigation that happen to be observable misapprehends the role of
district judges and risks mischaracterizing their work.
Procedural context also matters because different district court
decisions face different risks of appellate reversal. Depending upon
the type of decision, the probability that appellate review will occur
at all can vary drastically, and the standard of review that will be
applied may differ as well. Many district court decisions, such as
rulings on discovery or procedural matters, are effectively
unreviewable because they are not final judgments that are
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immediately appealable.76 While interlocutory appeal is theoretically
possible, an extremely small proportion of non-final decisions are
ever subject to such appeal;77 without the right to immediate review
an aggrieved party has little recourse. Any errors by the district court
may become moot if the case is settled or ultimately resolved in that
party’s favor. Even if the objection is preserved and raised on appeal
after a final judgment, the appellate court will be reluctant to void a
judgment reached after a case was fully litigated on the basis of
erroneous rulings early in the proceedings.78 Thus, procedural
decisions regarding matters such as party joinder or discovery are
effectively insulated from review. Even some significant substantive
rulings, such as a partial grant of summary judgment, may be difficult
to reverse after a case is finally concluded.79 For those decisions that
are appealed, the degree of scrutiny given the district court’s decision
will vary depending upon the type of decision. Questions of law are
closely re-examined under an exacting de novo standard,80 while
appellate courts are far more deferential to district court findings of
fact or decisions relating to the management of the lawsuit.81 Because
dockets provide information about all types of district court
decisions, researchers can take into account the procedural context
when studying district judges’ decisions.
A second advantage to utilizing dockets as a data source is that it
allows direct study of selection effects. Filed cases reach discovery
only if they survive the pleadings stage. Summary judgment is
considered only if a case was not dismissed at the pleadings stage and
no settlement has occurred. Cases are tried only if any summary
judgment motion was denied. And so on. Thus, selection effects will
progressively limit the pool of cases actually adjudicated at various
stages of the litigation, and these pools of cases surviving at each
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
77. See Solimine, supra note 26, at 1174.
78. Appellate courts should not reverse for “errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006).
79. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 660–66 (explaining how expanded pretrial activity and rules of appeal
have created a significant set of lower court rulings that are effectively unreviewable).
80. 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 206.04[1] (3d ed.
2008).
81. Id. at §§ 206.03 [1]–[6], 206.05[1].

2009] How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making? 109

stage may differ in systematic ways from all filed cases and from
each other. Information from dockets allows the researcher to track
the entire progress of cases over time and therefore to model these
selection effects. Which cases with what characteristics survive to
each stage of the litigation process? And how do the cases subject to
adjudication at each stage differ from filed cases and from one
another?
Finally, dockets permit exploration of a closely related question:
Does judicial decision-making influence the parties’ settlement
decisions? To the extent that scholars have paid attention to selection
effects, they have assumed that their importance lies in limiting the
pool of cases that remain to be adjudicated.82 While this effect is
important, the possibility that judicial decision-making in turn
influences settlement behavior has been largely ignored in empirical
studies of district court litigation.83 Theory instructs that litigants’
willingness to settle turns on their expectations regarding the ultimate
outcome of the case. Although the parties may begin the litigation
with an estimate of the likely outcome, they will have repeated
opportunities for updating their predictions as they glean additional
information about the strengths and weaknesses of their cases during
the litigation process. The district judge, by ruling on procedural
matters, commenting informally on the evidence, and even by setting
schedules, can dramatically impact the parties’ estimates of their
chances of success before, during, and after trial, thereby encouraging
settlement and influencing its terms.84 In fact, one of the premises of
82. See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57, at 259 (observing that because litigants can
decide to settle a case or present it to the court for judgment, cases actually adjudicated are
unlikely to be a random sample of filed cases); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 44 (arguing
that because of litigant selection effects and judge publication decisions, published district court
decisions are not representative of cases filed).
83. Some scholars have noted this possibility. For example, Rowland and Carp suggest
that pretrial rulings “can change dramatically the balance of probable trial outcomes and,
therefore, of each side’s incentives to settle a case.” ROWLAND & CARP supra note 21, at 122;
see also KRITZER, supra note 68. This theory, however, has not been subjected to much
empirical testing. While Ashenfelter et al. tested for judge effects on case outcomes including
settlements, they aggregate these outcomes by judge, comparing, for example, mean settlement
rates per judge, rather than testing whether specific judicial decisions influenced the likelihood
of settlement. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 57, at 270–77.
84. The situation in appellate courts is not exactly analogous. Because oral argument is
typically the only pre-decisional contact that the parties have with the appellate judges deciding
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the shift to managerial judging is that the actively involved trial judge
can more quickly move cases towards resolution. By collecting data
on district judge interventions in a case and the timing of settlement,
researchers can test whether the decisions of the district judge
influence litigant settlement decisions.
IV. OUR EEOC PROJECT
In an ongoing project, we seek to exploit these advantages of
using dockets as a data source. Currently, we are collecting and
analyzing data on federal court litigation brought between October 1,
1996, and September 30, 2006, by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency charged with
enforcing the laws forbidding race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, age, and disability discrimination by employers. We began with
a list of the nearly 4000 employment discrimination cases filed in all
district courts by the EEOC on behalf of individual complainants
during this time period. We stratified our initial, comprehensive list
of cases into two groups. Group 1 consisted of all cases in which a
trial or appeal took place, cases resolved by a judicial decision, and
cases involving more than one “benefited party.”85 The nearly 1700
cases in this group were all included in our sample. Group 2
consisted of the remaining 2220-plus cases; of these, we randomly
selected 1000 for inclusion in our study. From this initial sample, a
handful were dropped because they did not in fact fit the criteria for
inclusion or the relevant data was missing or difficult to code,86
their case, party expectations of what the judges will likely do are probably very stable, with
few opportunities for updating. Of course, if the parties are notified of the judges on their
assigned panel in advance, it might influence their expectations of the outcome and, hence, the
likelihood of settlement. In that case, however, it is not anything that the judges do, but simply
who they are that influences the likelihood of settlement. However, interactions at oral
argument can give the parties a direct sense of how the judges view the particular case, just as
the many pre-trial rulings of a district court judge entail contacts that give the parties
information about their litigation prospects. See, e.g., JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE
APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 55–63 (2002).
85. Note that some of the cases in Group 1 had more than one of these features.
86. Cases were dropped from the sample for the following types of reasons: cases could
not be found because the docket number in our initial list was missing or, apparently, incorrect;
the case involved enforcement of an administrative subpoena rather than an antidiscrimination
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resulting in a final sample of about 2500 cases for analysis. For each,
we are using the district court docket number provided by the EEOC
to search PACER for additional data. We have located docket sheets
in all the cases, as well as pleadings and settlement documents in a
substantial portion of them.
From the case docket, we collect information about the judge, the
defendants, any intervening private parties, the motions filed in the
case, the timing and disposition of those motions, and whether and
when the case settled. In cases resolved by a judicial decision, we
collect information on the type of decision (e.g., dismissal, summary
judgment granted, trial, etc.), the prevailing party, the amount of
monetary relief, whether injunctive relief was granted, and whether
the losing party appealed.
The database we are constructing is very comprehensive but fairly
ordinary for the most part (except that it is web-based, to facilitate
multiple users’ access, and provides links to the relevant documents,
to facilitate both data entry and review). But it does have one unusual
feature. Most research databases are “flat”—that is, they array the
data in a two-dimensional grid with rows and columns. But a flat
database could not accommodate the enormous variation in the
number, type, and sequence of party motions, court orders, and other
litigation events in the district courts. We have therefore built the
database to incorporate multiple tables, to allow us to enter
information on as many case events as occur. Each case in the
database is an observation in the main table. Additional tables record
information about each litigation event in a case as a separate
observation with its own row of data, which is then linked to the main
table. Thus, for each case, we are able to capture any number of case
events, from zero to thousands.87
lawsuit; the case involved preliminary injunctive enforcement of a settlement reached and
memorialized outside of litigation; the case was a lawsuit against a governmental defendant; the
case turned out to have been filed prior to our study period; or the case was consolidated with
other litigation in a way that was too complex to be captured by our coding protocol.
87. For each motion, we collect: Date; Docket Entry #; Type; Filing Party; Consent
Status; Written Opposition Filed; Date of Outcome; Outcome Docket Entry #; Identity of
Decision-maker; and Outcome. For each non-motion event, we collect: Date; Docket Entry #,
and Event Type.
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These data will allow us to conduct tests and analyses of district
court litigation and judicial decision-making that would be
impossible with traditional sources of outcome data. For example, we
plan to test theories of judicial decision-making using all district
court decisions in EEOC litigated cases—published and unpublished,
final and non-final—while taking into account the procedural context
of each decision. The data will allow us to model different types of
decisions separately and to consider how the different risks of
appellate review might affect those decisions. In addition, we plan to
use a hazard model to predict the distribution of settlements over
time, examining not only the effect of case characteristics potentially
relevant to the settlement decision but also the timing and nature of
judicial interventions.
CONCLUSION
Empirical study of district judge decision-making has long been
limited by both inadequate theoretical models and inaccessible data.
However, the development of the electronic filing system in federal
courts and the current availability of dockets and litigation documents
through PACER have significantly reduced the obstacles to obtaining
detailed information about the work of the district courts. In order to
fully exploit the wealth of data now coming on line, researchers need
to develop better models of district court decision-making. Given the
significant differences between appellate and trial court decisionmaking, traditional models that analyze only opinions, treat all
district judges alike, and ignore the impact of settlement are simply
inadequate. Instead, we argue for a new approach—one that uses
dockets to study district judge decisions (not just opinions), takes into
account the procedural context of these decisions, and directly studies
how the settlement behavior of litigants may both influence and be
influenced by district judge decision-making. Only after developing
models that incorporate the unique institutional setting of district
courts in these ways can empirical research bring greater
understanding of district judge decision-making.

